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THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
August 5, 1971 
Dear Senator: 
Enclosed is the full text of the President's ress 
conference yesterday. May I call your attention particularly 
to President Nixon's statements on pages 6 through 13. It is 
here that the President speaks in some detail to the issues 
of strike settlements, restraints on wage and price increases, 
the cost of living, and his relationship with Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman Arthur Burns. 
It is hoped that this material will be of help to you in 
responding to questions from your constituents regarding 




Couns el to the Pre sident 
for Congressional Relations 
PRESS CONFERr~NCE NO. 18 
of the 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
.. 
11 ~ 36 A. B • EDT 
August 4, 1971 
Wednesday 
In the Oval Office 
At The White House 
Washington, D. C. 
THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, I wanted to 
begin this with a brief resume of the conversation I have just 
had with the Secretary of State, because · I know the subject will 
probably come up in any event. 
This is in regard to the Pakistan refugee situation, 
to recap what we have done. Insofar as the refugees, who are in 
India are concerned, we have provirled $70 million to date for 
the refugees, "and we are prepared to provide more. That, 
incidentally, is more than all the rest of the nations of the 
world put together, so it is a substantial amount. 
As far as those in East Pakistan themselves are 
concerned, whereas you know there are prospects of famine, in 
the event that the crop reports are as bad as they seem t o be, 
at this time we have 360,000 tons of grain ready for shipment 
there. We have also alotted $3 million for the chartering of 
ships for the purpose of getting the grain into the overcrowded 
ports. 
·As a further step, the Secretary of State has worked 
out with my very strong approval a plan to go to the United 
Nations next week to talk to the responsible and appropriate 
members of the United Nations, including the U. N. High 
Cornmiss·ioner in that office, to see "what additional steps can 
be taken on both fronts to help the refugees in India from 
East Pakistan, and also to help those who are in East Pakistan 
and are presently confronting famine situations. 
With regard to a problem that was addressed by the 
House yesterday, we do not favor the idea that the United States 
should -cut off economic assistance to Pakistan. ' To do so would 
simply aggravate the refugee problem because it would mean that 
the ability of the Government of Pakistan to work ,,,ith the U.N., 
as it presently has indicated it is willing to do so in 
distributing the food supplies, its ability to create some 
stability would be seriously jeopardized. 
We feel ·that the most constructive role we can play 
is to continue our economic assistance to ~Jest Pakistan and,· 
thereby to be able to influence the course of events in a way 
that will deal with the problem of hunger in East Pakistan 
which ... would reduce the refugee flow into India, and which will, 





We are not going to engage in public pressure on the 
Government of West Pakistan. Th.at would be totally counter-
productive. These are matters that we will discuss only in 
private channels. 
. . . . . 
QUESTION: Mr. Presi~ent, can you tell us any more 
about your forthcoming trip to China, when it is likely to 
occur, and can .you give· us your assessment of what effect 
you think this . will have on ending the war in Vietnam? 
THE PRESIDENT: As far as the timing is concerned, 
I cannot add to what I ~aid .in the original announcement. 
It will be befQre May 1 • . The time .will be ·worked out sometime 
within the next two . to three months, I would assume, and a 
considerable amount of preparatory activity must take place, . 
setting up the agenda, setting up the numbers in the official 
pal;'ty. 
.. • f 
.. 
, These ar~ matters, of ' c9urse, that must be' discussed 
and worked out before the time .of the visit is finally . 
. . . 
announced. . . 
. , . 
Second, and I know a number of you are interested 
in who is going, that is a matter still to be decided. It 
was raised by. Dr •. Kissinger and by Premier Chou En-lai in their con-
versations, and ~~ll be worked .out by mutual agreement. 
. - ' . 
As far as . our .party is concerned; .it will be a small 
working party. The only ones that presently . are .definitely 
going are, of course, the Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger 
and myself. -Beyond that, whatever others will be added will 
be determined by mutual .agreement .between the parties con-
cern~d. 
Now, as to the effect the visit will have and the conver-
sations will have or.. V.ietnam, · I .will not speculate on that subject. 
t wil~ only say .that as . 't:he joint announcement indicated, 
this .will 'be a wide-ranging discussion of issues concerning 
both governments. l .t is not a dis.cussi.on that is going to ' 
lead to instant detente. 
What it really is, is mQving, a~ we have moved,. I , 
believe, inthe situation w,i th, ' reg~rd to the Soviet Union, from 
an era of confrontation without communication to an era of 
negotiat~ons with discu~sion. It does not mean ·that we 
go into these meetings on either side with any illusions 
about the wide, differences that we hav~. Our interests 'are 
very different, and both sides recognize this, .in: the talks . . 
that Dr. Kissinger had, very extended talks he had with Premier Chou 
En-lai. We do not. expec~ that these talks will .settle all 
. of those differences. 
• t • '\ 
.. 
_,. , What is important is that we wi~l have o.pened 
commuri1cation to see where our differences are irreconcilable , .. ' . . , 
to see ' tha:t th~y can be s~ttled peacefully, and · to find thos.e 
a~eas where the United states, which today is the mo~t ·power-
fu! nation in the world, can find an agreement with the most 
populous nation in the world which potentially in the future 












. .-. . 
:~,<' As we look at the peace in 'thQ :." world for the 
balance of this century, and for ' that matter the next century, 
we must recognize that there cannot be world peace on which 
." all the peoples in the world can rely, and in which they have 
Such a ~reat stake, unless there is communication between ~nd 
some negotiation between these two gzeat superpowers, the 
Peoples Republic and the United States • 
" 
I have put this in general te~s, because that is 
the understanding of the Peoples Republic, Premier Chou En-lai, 
and it is our understanding that our agenda \-lil1 be worked 
out at a l:.ater 'point; before the trip it will be very care-
fully work~d out so that the discussions will deal with the 
hard problems as well as the easy ones~ 
'i 
We e'xpect to make some progress, but to speculate 
about what progress will be made on any , particular i~sue, to 
speculate, for example, as to what effect this might have on , 
Vietnam, would not serve the interests of constructive talks. 
~': . 
QUESTION: Can '! ask a relate.d policy .question on . 
Vietnam? , 
THE PRESIDENtr: Sure. 
QUESTION: There have been some, sugge~tions " in91l:1din9 
some indirect hints from China], that a negotiat1ng'forum 1nvolv1ng ar 
Asian conference to be held in Asia, pri'marily with Asian 
participants, but the United States as well, might be a better 
, 
forum for 'negotiating a settlement in Vietnam. Can you speak 
to that? 
THE 'PRESIDENT: Hr. Bailey, the question of whether 
there should be an ' all-Asian conference ," 'wi th the Government 
of the 'Pe'oples Republic participating, as you know, has risen 
several times over the past few months, and was raised before 
our announcement was made. 
As far as we are concerned, we will consider any 
proposal that might contribute to a more peacefu1 situation 
in the Pacific and in the world. HONever, at . this point there 
is no understanding be~~een the United States and the Peoples. 
Republic as to whethe+, o'r not Qut of this meeting sho,uld 
'. l' " 
come that kind, of pr~posal~ , 
. 
Let me say on that score, there were no conditions 
asked for ori either side, and none accepted. There were no 
deals made on either side, or accepted, none offered and none 
accepted. This is a discussion which will take place with 
both sides knowing in advance that there are problems, 
but with both sides well prepared. Thi~ is the secret of 
any successful summit meeting. ' 
As you know, parenthetically, I have ~lways take~ 
somewhat of a dim view of summitry when it c,omes in an unp~e,"' ; '" 
pared fornl. But both sides will be well prepare,d, wel,l in " ' . . ' ~ 
advance, on all points of major difference, and we will dis-
cuss any points of difference that could affe,~t'l ,th.e/ peace of 
the world. " ,,' ~ :', ~~"';:,~, I," 
MORE 
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• ~ . ". . 
QUESTION: Mr. President, is there any diplomatic 
reason you ~ight not visit t~e Soviet Union ,before going 
• .. .. t . • • 
to Peking? That 'was sug~ested~ 
# ~ ~. • • 
• \ , '" p 
THE' PRESIDENT: ' In view of the announcement we' have 
m~de on ' o~r vis~t to Pekins, tha~ . wi~l be the first visit that 
,C .,. 
I 'will make. ' Obviously, it ' takes" a great deal o~ ~ime to ~ 
prepare a 'visit and to attempt now to visit -- and the ~oviet Union, 
I am sure D feels exactly the same \'iay· ;. ... ·... to attE:inp';: to rush 
around and have a summit meeting in ~'1oscow before we go to 
Peking 'would not be: in the interest of either country~ 
" .' .. . ,' '. . ' .. 
. ' t would add 'this point, too: When Foreign ~·tinister 
Gromyko was l'here, we discussed the possibility of a possible 
• 4Ir "'.. /' ., 
summit meeting, and we had a very candid discussion. , ' He 
agreed and said that his government leaders agreed with my 
,position, which was that a meeting at the highest level should 
take 'place 'and would be useful only when there was something 
substantive to 'discuss that could not be handled in other 
channels • "~ , .. : ' '. 
ro. 
With r~gard to the Soviets, I should, also point out 
that 'we are :making ' verysignifieant prbgress on Berlin. We 
are making good progress on SALT. Discussions are still con-
tinuing on the Mideast, although there I will not speculate 
about what the prospects for success are in view of the fact 
,that Mr. S;sco is presently i,n t~~ area exploring with the 
" g,overnwe~ts cQncerned ~.'-'.ha·t · the pos~i!)ilitie9 of ~.or.~e interi:u sattle-
. ...... . I . , ."" < 1 . . ... • .• ~ , 
rnent 10okJ.ng < to:ward a . ,final ~ett.l~ment mn.y be., " . . ... . , 
, . . ... 
;Having r~'l(~nticIled thes~ ~h.ree , ,~re~s in",\!hict,L \,re are n'3gotiating 
with the Soviet Union, I ' will add ' that if the time comes, as 
it may come, and both sides ~' realize this, then the final 
breakthrough in any of these areas can take place only at the 
highest level, and then there will be a meeting. But as far 
as the timing of the' me~ting before the visit to ~eking, that 
would not be' ·"an appropriate 'thing to do. . 
~ •• ' • • t I 
. 
QUESTION: I was thinking of such a thing as a 
settlement on the SALT talks. 
• I " . , 
, 
, , . 
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Theis, _when I said there was 
good prog:ress 'b'eing made' dn SALT, it is still a very ~e,ch­
nical and sticky ' problem "for both sides, because , 1'1; involves 
our vital interests" Let me emphasize that in SA:LT, ,poth sides 
are asked to make an agreement which limits' that~ · Thi's is not 
unilateral. We, on our part, will be having very severe limi-
tations with regard to, our defensive capability, the ABM. 
They, on their part, will' have ' limitations on the~r qffensive 
capabili'ty ,t:~Hi r ~:-I \.:~ld '\.'~P' '. of offer..si-V€! missiles. '·' 
. . " .:.. ~ . .. -. . ~ 
" . 
• • • -. • ~ 06 • • • • '.,. 
Neither side c~ make ,those de~isions lightly, 
without verY', very.hasfc discussions, but:' .:the ~act that we , 
have at the highest level committed 'ourselves to working 
toward an agreement simultaneously ~his year on ,both those 
issues, and the fact that since the talks at Helsinki began , 
that we have' made progress, giyes hope ' that we are going to 
• make an .arrd.n~!~~!lent 0 
4 t' . .... .. ( .. -t, " 
. ' . But to speculate that mayb-e we are going to get 
that done before we go to Peking, I think, would be itl·-advised. 






you not accepted QUESTION: ' Mr. President, why have 
the Viet 'Cong propo~3als after all these weeks 
given some formal reply? 
of probing, or 
," 
THE PRESIDENT: .. I have noted some criticism in the 
press about the fact that Ambassador Bruce had to leave 
August 1st. Incidentally, I am most grateful that he stayed 
' an extra month, becau;se his doctor got hold of me and, said 
he 'should have left' July 1st. In any event, his having left , 
August 1st, and Mr. Porter not being able to arrive until the ' latter 
pctrt of August, there has been some speculation, and I under-
stand this, criticism in the press and the Senate and the House 
that the Administration is not intere~ted in n~gotiating a 
settlement. that ~ we are not considering the various proposals 
that have been made by the VC and North Vietnamese. 
, " 
Now, just so the members of" the press will not get 
. out "on a limb with regard to predicting \-That we are or are 
not doing, let nl~' make one statement and t~en I will go no 
further. 
We are very actively pursuing negotiations on 
Vietnam in established channels. The record, when it finally 
comes out, wilf answer all the critics'as far as the activity 




, '.. I • 
It would not be useful to negot1ate 1n the news-
we want to have those negotiations succeed. 
. " . . 
. 
I am not predicting that the negotiations will 
succeed. I am~aying, <however, that as far as the united . ~ . ,. . 
States 15 concerned, we have gone and are g01ng the extra 
, mile on negotiations ' in established channels. You can 
interpret - that abY way you want, b~t do not interpret it in 
, . 
, 
a way that indicates that the ' United States i~ missin~ this 
opportunity or that opportunity, or another one, to negotiate. 
QUES'TION: l'4r. President; one of the points being , " , 
mentioned in the comments on the negotiations is the election 
in South Vietnam this fall. 'Is that a factor that does have 
some bearing on the pace of the negotiations? 
THE PRESIDENT: It has certainly in terms of the 
North Vietnamese. As you know, the stumbling block for them 
in negotiations really is; ,the polit1"cal settlement. As "t:hey 
look at the elec~ion' this 'fall ', they feel that unless that 
election comes out in' a way ,that a candidate they can, support, 
or at' least that they are 'riot as much against as they are 
President Thieu, but unless it comes out ' that way, it will be , 
very .difficult for them to have a negotiated settlement. 
With regard to the elections, let me emphasize our 
position. Our position is one of compiete neutrality in these 
elections. Under ... !ui.Lassado:,,::, Bunker I s ski.llful , direction, ~,~~ ~have 
" ' 
made it clear to, all parties' concerned that , we are not support~ 
ing any candidate; that we will accept the ,verdict of the 
people of South Vietnam. , , 
I have) ,noted, for example, that President ,Thieu . 
has invited observers to come from other nations to witness 
" 
the election. I hope observers , do go. r thi!1k they. "'ill :find, I 
hope the~' ~~'il1 find 9 as they ~id ';.1hen they ohs(~rved" ,previous 
~lecti9ns in VietnarJ; that by JilOSt standards they were fair. 
MORE 
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As far as observers from this country are concerned, 
we have, of co,urse, seve,ral members of the Senate.,,~~nd others 
that have , indicated, a desire to go. W~, of course, · have no 
obj ection . to that. We want a fair election and we, of., cot;lrse, 
have some observers on the scene in the person of the Ambas-
sador and his st.aff .who · wil~ watch that., elec~~on • . 
• . .. 
~ . . 
, ' 
QUESTION: Mr.' Presi,dent, the last time . you 
stock market advice to, us, it turned out pretty well. 
would you, do now, buy o~ sell? 
g,ave s,~me 
What . 
THE PRESIDENT: With regard to the stock market, I 
suppose my advice sho~ld not be given much weight because I 
am not in the market. It is so easy to make predictions 
where your own assets are not involved. ' 
I will say this: I wo~ld not sell the united States 
economy short at this point. And long term, I would not be sell-
ing my investments, in the American economy whether it is in 
stocks or real estate or what have you; selling them in a 
panicky way • 
. The stock market· has corne up, even at its present 
level of 850, 230 points since I made that prediction. , I can 
on~y say that my long-range predi,ction for this economy is 
still what I said at the first ~f this year. 
l'i.. the first o'f this year, when the very same people 
had wri tten -- and I have read :the n€~~s r:lagazines and, business 
\ ; .. 
magazines, and not, of course, any of the columns you had 
written this week -- but ·I heard all the rest this , week, and 
" " 
the gloomy predictions, about ~he , economy and it is going down 
and there is nothing good about , it. I read them also f 'or 
November of ' last year; exactly the same gloominess and ,same 
.' 
words, and so forth. 
I said then, and I ,think all of you 'were present then, 
1 thought 1971 would be a goo,d year for the ~conomy, and 
19~2 ' would be a very good year. I stand by that., vfuen we 
look at the first half of this year, it is not what people 
said about the economy; it is what they do about it that 
counts. 
GNP is up a record $52 billion. Retail sales now 
in June, and the first indications as far as July are con-
cerned, it will stay a~ this level, are at record highs. 
Consumer spending is at a record high. Construction,' particu-
larly in housing, are near record highs. Inventories--
and this is another indication of what will happen to the 
future for those who may be thinking of investing their money 
businesses -- inventories are a~normally low in view of the 
higrl). level of r~tail sales. , . ' 
~fuat this tells me ~s " that th~re is a lot of steam 
in the boiler in this econ9my, and you cannot cortinue to have 
high retail sales "and low inventories w~thQut eventually 
star.ting to rebuild. Therefore, my projection for the balance 
of this , year . ~s t~~t the ~co~omy will, con~inue to move up as 
it has moved up in the first half. ,(; . 












That doesn't mean that there will not be aberra-
, tions ' in the monthly figures. It does mean, however, that the 
economy has a great deal of strength in it. This is a period 
when it is absorbing ' almost 2 million people who have been let 
out of defense plants and the Armed Forces, and is abso~bing 
that with a lower rate of unemployment than was the case 
in 1961, 1962, 1963, which were the last three peacetime years 
before Vietnam when the unemployment rate, as you recall, 
averaged 6 percen't. ' 
. 
QUESTION: Mr. President, in that connection, to 
continue that, does ~that ' mean that you , are still resolutely 
opposed to any incomes policy or, .specifically, wage-price 
controls? 
THE PRESIDENT: I think, Peter, it is well to 
identify incommpolicies and wage-pric~ controls for what 
they are and what they are not, because, as a matter of 
fact -- and this gives me an opportunity to set the rec,ord 
straight with regard to some greatly blown up differences that 
I am Supposed to have with my very good friend Arthur Burns, 
' and perhaps ' you WEre too polite to ask that direct question --
QUESTION: Well, I will ask it. 
THE PRESIDENT: 
up, so I anticipated it. 
< 
I thought that would be the follow-
Let me ' get at it ~his way: 
Arthur Burns, in terms of monetary policy and in 
terms · of fiscal policy, has followed a course that I think 
is the most responsible 'and statesmanlike of any Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve in my memory. In other words, you have 
seen an expansionary monetary policy, and that is one of .the 
reasons we have had an expansionary economy in the first six 
months of this year. 
He has also stood :firt~ly wjAth this Admini,stration 
in its responsible fiscal policy, resistin9, for example, 
spending above what the economy would produce at full capa-
city. He has strongly supported me in those efforts. 
That brings me to an area where he has taken a 
very unfair shot. Within this Administration ; tile· Office of 
Budget and Management, on 'a ' reorganization ,plan two months 
ago, recommended that the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, be-
cause he basically is our central banker, should be raised 
to the same status of the central bankers abroad. I enthusi-
astically approved the idea. However, when the matter was 
raised with Dr. Burns by my associates, he indicated that 
neither he nor any other individual in a· high position . in 
Government should take a salary increase at a time that the 
President was going to have to tak~ some strong measures, 
as I am going to take to liri1i t ~alary increases in 
other areas of Government, including, for example, blue collar 
workers. 
So, consequently, while there is not any question but 
that the Federal Reserve position will eventually pe raised 
to the Level I position that was recomrne~ded, Arthur Burns 
and, inCidentally, George Shultz, who is also on this list as 
a recommendation of the Ash Council, Art~ur Burns and George 
Shultz being the responsible men that they were, asked that 
there not be an example set by them of a pay increase 
lvtORE 
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which would make it very difficult for us to deal .,effectively 
and responsibly wi th p,ay increases in other sectors of the 
Government. So we find that Burns agrees, that I agree with 
~ Burns, let's put it that way, very strongly on his monetary 
policy, on his fiscal policy, the question he has raised with 
regard to an incomes policy. 
~fuen we talk about an incomes policy, let's see what 
he is not for. He is unalterably opposed, as I am, to the 
Galbraith scheme, which is supported by many of our Democratic '. . Senators, I understand, of permanent wage and price controls. 
p'ennanent wage and price controls in America would stifle the 
American economy, its dynamism, its productivity, and would 
be, I think, a mortal blow to the United States as a first-
class economic power. 
On the other hand, it is essential that Government 
use its p~wer where it can be effective to stop the escalation, 
or at least temper the escalation in the wage-price spiral. 
"That is why we moved on cons.truction, and we have been some-
what Isuccessful, from .16 down to: .9 percent. That is whywe moved 
to · roll back an oil price recently. 
. . . 
As far as the two recent settlements, the one 1n 
railroads and the one in steel, on the plus side, ~he fact that 
they were settled was positive; the fact, too, that in the case 
of railroads ', they spoke to the problem of productivity by 
modification of work rules, ' and the fact that the steel settle-
ment also spoke to the pr~blem of productivity by setting up 
productivity councils, that was constructive • 
. On the other hand, . I would be less ,-, than candid if · 
I were not to say, and I know ' t~e leaders of the steel and 
railroad industry know this, that this kind of settlement 
where a wage increase leads to a price increase, and particu-
larly in steel, where the industry is already noncompetitive 
'with foreign imports, is not in the interest of America, not 
in the in~erest of labor, and not in the interest of industry. 
Dr. Burns, without being completely specific, has 
only suggested the idea should be considered. That is why 
Secretary Connally said we welcome the move by several Republican 
Senators to hold hearings concer~ing wage and price supports. 
That·· is why Dr. Burns s :aid we sho'uld move to attempt to 
temper these incrEbases. . l 
The problem here is, how can we move wi thout~, putting .. . 
the American economy in a ' straitj,acket? In other words, as 
Secretary Connally raised the question in his statement this 
morning, flAre we to have ' criminal penalties? Are, for example, 
the wage-price guidelines to affect all the examples down to · 
the neighborhood filling station or the grocery store or the 
. , 
meat market, as the case might be, or will they affec.t only 
major ~ iridustries? 
As far as this Administration is concerned, I can 
say this: I have asked the Secretary of Labor to bring to my 
attention every major wage-price negotiatior which may be 
coming up in the future, and I will use the power of this 
office to the extent it can be effective to see that those · 
negotiations are as responsible as possible. 
MORE 




On Septernber 21st, we 'will have a meeting of our 
Productivity Commission, and Subject .iAn ~n that meeting 
will be this same problem, because as we look at America's 
trade balances, which have deteriorated over the past 10 
years, but as we look at l~erica's competitive position, 
it is essential that American industry and American labor sit 
down together and determine whether, at a time when we are 
in a race, we no longer can be Number 1 simply because we were 
' that ' big and that strong after World War I, whether we deter-. . ~. ... . . 
rn~ne we are go~ng to get out : of the race or whether we are go~ng 
to tighten 'our belts and be respon~ible in wage-price decisions 
so that we can continue to be competitive in the world. 
, 
That speaks to the problem of an incom~policy, 
this meeting that we will have. The only question of dif- . I 
ference between Arthur Burns, and some Senators have rai~ed 
this question, is the degree to which, in tackling these 
individual wage settlements, we have compUlsion, we have 
criminal penalties. I don't think they want compulsion or 
crimIinal .pena'r ties. . < 
< Then the question is ' ~ H.~ far will persuasion 
. ' ; r 
go " . 'oui record shows -that in most cou~tries abroad that 
hav~ tried it, except" for very small coun~ries th~t are 
tightly controlled, persuasion alone will work for only three 
to four months. 
~ ' So ' as far as we are concerned, I am glad to con--
sider recommendations for tackling the problem. I will tackle 
them, and I am serving notice now that we are going to take 
up the problem with the Productivity Commission. We are going 
to look at each individual settlement in major industries oNhere 
there is going to be wage-price negotiations, and use ~he 
inf ! fuence -we can to keep them in line',' and in addition to that, 
we will consider a recommendation on wage-price boards. But 
I will reject it if I find, and I have yet to find any recom-
.;' 'mendation that did not have this in9~edient in it, if I find 
! ' -that it would impose a new bureaucracy with enormous criminal 
powers, to fasten itself 6n the American economy. That, I " 
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QUESTION: In the same line to follow up that 
question, if the settlement in the steel industry and particular-
ly the raise in prices which was recently announced is not good 
foi" tr;.E- country' · {.~r:.c\ . . no·t g(> 0 c" fer In~~:c:c ene. PEtnager lent.7, V:tY <10 you 
not c nll .iL t!"'~ e le; {;c rg or . tile st\i;el incustry · ·~nt.: use YOUI: 
influence to . g2t them to (;~1 f·n0(~ t he ir"cre .:··; .. s..:.~ ir !:Jrices and then if 
nece~sary other parts of the: settlen':.6nt which are so inimicable 
to the country? , 
THE PRESIDENT~ Calling in the steel industry and 
getting them to change would not be effective. As you may 
recall, in one instance earlier this year, we were able to get 
a steel rollback. That had a ' 'temporary beneficial effect. But 
at a time that the steel industry has negotiated a settlement 
of this nature, at a time when its profits at 2-1/2 percent are 
the lowest of any major industry, to tell the steel industry 
that after they have negotiated a settlement they must roll back 
their price and run at a loss is simply unrealistic. They are 
not going to do it. 
The longer term answer here is ' for the steel 
industry, and this is what we have a~dressed ourselves to, and 
the labor to recognize that now that they have had their 
settlement, nO'\1 that labor has gotten a good . increase, an 
increase consis~ent with aluminum and others, now that steel 
found it necessary to raise prices that this may be· ,good 
temporarily for tot rA ~ut in t~l e long run it ·.rill sii~ply mea.."l less 
steel sol e arlQ less jobs ~nd that i::z why ~i1e are zeroing in 0:. 
the productivity sid0 ~eC2USG incrocses in pro~uctivity cen b~ 
th~ ,only ans ' leY' 'h1t~ere a wage incr~nse of this kind t ,::kes 
pli'ceo 
QUESTION~ Mr. President, a minute ago you men~ioned 
something about doing something about wages for government 
employees. 
THE PRESIDENT~ Yes, one of the problems, difficult 
problems, I confronted last year and thc':1t I ,yoill conf .. ont again 
this yea~ is 'a recommendation to increase the wages for blue 
collar workers within the gqvernment. I have examined that 
situation and I have determined that an increase in the blue 
collar wage scale would not be in the interests of our fighting 
the inflation battle. 
Speaking to the same point, we have a situation with 
regard to the Congress and some of its appropriations bills. 
We are trying to keep our budget within the full employment 
limits for 1972. 
The Congress already has exceeded our budget by $5.4 
billion. That includes mandatory spending which they have 
imposed upon us and additions to the appropriations bills. 
Before they get through with the appropriations process I hope 
that comes down. 
But that will be highly inflationary unless the 
Congress speaks to that problem more effectively. What I was 
indicating, in other words, Herb, I am indicating in advance the 
decision that I do not intend to approve the wage increase 
relative to the blue collar workers in the government. Under 
those circumstances, I could not, of course, approve an increase 
in salaries for people as underpaid basically as Dr. Burns is, 
considering what he could get on the outside or Dr. Shultz is, 
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QUESTION~ How many people are there in the blue 
collar area? 
THE PRESIDENT : I don't have that but ' it is a 
significant number. Incidentally, I think it is an equitable 
decision because they have had $ ::i':-.9 9ubst~J1ti al increi1 '~e.:3 in t~·~;~ 
'~'& :J'~o It i :J a '1u~~tion of phether 'jl ~:; jU;1t co~tinue for a short 
time. 
--
QUESTION: Sir, you also mentioned guidelines in a 
manner that suggested that you might accept the concept of numer-
ical guidelines, did you mean to suggest that? 
THE PRESIDENT~ No. What I meant to say was that my 
study of the situation indicates that guidelines in this country 
have always failed. They have never worked. G~idelines in 
other industrial . count~ies including Canada, for example, and 
Britain, have worked only for a short time and then have fallen 
because guidelines basically connote voluntary compliance and 
voluntary compliance goes on only for a brief time. 
Now, as far as what I am saying, it is t :lat O'..1r approact. 
at this time is a selective one to take those particular 
industries that are .coming up .for bargaining and to use our 
influence as ~ffectively as we can to see that those settlements 
are responsible. 
Secondly, that as far as a wage price board is 
concerned, that it would be considered favorably only if the 
hearings that are going to be taken· in this field, only if 
the hearings can convince me that enforcing an incomes policy 
could be accomplished without stifling t :-l® econo~y 0 
It is the problem, in other words, of enforcement I 
because I corne back to this fundamental proposition: I have yet 
to find except for the extremists on the left, and I don't say 
this in a conderllning way, it is only an obs'ervation, but the 
extremists on the left of the economy spectrum have always 
favored a ~otally government~controlled economy. 
They pelieve that. I don't believe it. They believe 
that we should .have permanent wage and price controls and that 
government should petermine what wages should be and what prices 
should be. I don't believe that. Dr. Burns does not' believe 
that if you have read his 3'-,seC:1es ever t h.::.. years . F e is a ~trong -opponent of that. 
The question is, how can we address ourselves to the 
problem of wages and prices without having those mandatory 
criminal penalty features '.vhich would lead us to something we 
all are trying to avoid. This is why this is a matter for 
discussiono 
It is not one yet for decision but I will continue 
to work on individual settlements as I have said. 
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QUESTIGN: Mr. President, would it be fair to say, 
then, that in view of what you said there and what you said 
earlier that you will consider recommendations of the wage 
and price board, that you are giving renewed and perhaps more 
favorable consideration to some form of wage-price board; 
assuming that they don't have penalties? . 
• 
" ." " THE PPESIDENT~ No. . I am saying that I shall 
;. ... ". cont-inue the poli 'cy of moving aggressively on individual 
settlements on a cas'8 -by-case basis. Secondly, I will 
addre$~ ~this particular pioblem in a meeting with the major 
leaders of .~~erican 'industry and American labor at the 
Productivity Commission meeting on September 21. Third,· 
. ~.. , . ~ . 
with regard to wage-price boards, I have still not been 
convinced that we .. can move in that direction and be effective. 
However., . Secretary Connally, in his statement this morning, 
rais~d all the questions that should' be raised on that. As 
far as we are concerned, we have an open mind in ·terms of 
examining the various proposals to ' se~ if th~re is a new approach 
which we may not have thought of. . 
I have serious doubts that they will find such 
a new approach, but I CO want to indicate that we will examine 
it because we all agree that the wage-p'rice spiral is a 
sig~ificant danger to t~: i3expanding economy. The question is 





QUESTION: ~1r. Presiden't, ' Dr~ Burns, before the Joint 
Committee, said he didn't think we wer~ ' making much 
against inflation. Do you think we are? 
THE PRESIDENT: I read Dr. Burns statement quite 
carefully. What he was saying is what I would say_ I would 
say it with regard to inflation and unemployment. I am never 
satisfied ~nd never ~.,ill be satisfied, and anybody in the free 
economy is never satisfied and ;> r.,·~! ~~6 ne~.· ':.:.r ""::: ::, ·t ': ~.'! f i e(, n ith 
an~thing except · perfection ,I 
That doesn't mean that we are going to reach 
perfection. ~'Vith regard to inflation, I ~.,ill just point to 
the numbers. Inflation, which, of course, was boiling along 
-; ~hen we came into office in January of '19 69 '~ reached its peak 
in 1970, six percent. Then the CPI dropped to 4 percent in . 
the first six months of 1969. Now, 4 percent is still too 
high, but that is progress. 
The GNP deflator, which of course goes far beyond 
the consumer price index, as you know, the GNP deflator covers 
. 
I ,. . . " • 
;~ · - ·'~·c - -'-~· ( ....... .. ,.. · ... C' -n( .. .. · •·· .... . • , ~.- ,. " " .,.. \:"'" ' . " , 'I • • , 
• • _ -' _. 4> ~. _ ..- ~ _ ....... _ ... .... '.' .....; ... • t:' ." ." .r..: •• t' . t · ,... ; '~. r" ~"n th s . ~ 'c' . .1 J., .• ), · wI _ _ .. ~ to 
.. "71 " ,.. ... . . h . " . • '" .... -. . - ' • ,.. ~ ..... ~ ••. • ~..... .J- . "·e"- "!/ e ars T .... .I:·., ,.. .... -0'-' ... ~'":' "" r... . i'"l ( ) t ,-)- - . .;. .: • . ~ -- " pi ... : _. \ l ~ .:)'" .L. bJ. ~ .:. _ c:. _ . w"" .. ..., 'L .~ ...... :: .. -,':" I . " - . . -enough, but it is progress. 
In the last month the CPI was higher than the 
average it has been for the first five months. We all know that 
these month-to-month ' variations are not ~·:~~C' t counts. }\1y view 
I 
is that we are making progress against inflation, but it is 
going to require continued strong policies on the part of the 
Administration with the cooperation of the Congress in limiting 
our budget expenditures to full capacity or full employment 
revenues. That is the battle we will continue to wage and it 
will also need cooperation from labor and management on limiting 
the wage price spiral. 
!~ORE 
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On the unemployment _ f 'r ont; '1,e h ave ·a sou\ewhat similar 
problem. In the last three peacetime years before the Kdr~an 
t!ar expenditures began to hypo the economy, 1961, 1962, ·'a11c. 1963, 
unemployment in those years av~raged six percent. We, - at this 
point, have brought unemploymerit below six percent, not : ~s much 
as we woul~ like. It reac~ed its ~eak in Ja~uary. It was·-6.2. 
What the figures will ' be for this month you will know on ' F~iday. 
I c.on r t know ,,-,hat they are myself. I ~lil1 read t h is a:; you eo and 
that is the '-!lay it should be. ". 
-', -, 
--
: But in any e'vent, the unemployment curve is ' C:OtJ\!n. 
Six point two "\Tas 'the high and~ we are now below si)( .pe~;cent. 
believe that it \'1i 11 continue, with monthly aberrations', on 
a downward course through the balance of the year. 
, .:- ·t' : : 
• . . J. -.to • ' • • 
I 
. ~ believe that as we go into 1972, I still stick 
t-lith my pr~'dicti-o'n that \l>1e shall see unemployment continue to 
move downward and that 1972, for that year, will be a very good 
year. 
I ltlould point out one final thing on the unemploy-
ment factso A.s I have often pointed out, as of this morning I 
looked at the numbers, over 2 million P~ericans have been let out 
of the 2.rrned services and out of defense plants since we 
started to wind down the 'far in Vietnam. 
If they were in the services or in the defense plants 
at the present time, unemployment would be 4.3. But the other 
side of that coin is that casualties when we came in were 300 a 
week. This week, last week, they were 12. 
I just think the price is too high to pay. We 
believe that our goal of a new prospect of low 
unemploYlnent but \flith peace and not at the cost of war is one 
that Americans are willing to work toward. 
We are going to achieve that goal. Getting back to 
the stock market question I I will simply say thiS: ~~verybody else 
has been prophetic about the future. I think the prophets who 
presently say that the American economy is on the skids, that 
we have made no progress on inflation, that the economy is not 
moving up, who ignore the $52 billion increase in GNP, who 
ignore the increase in retail sales, who ignore the strong, 
positive elements in the economy, I think by the end of this year 
that they are going to look bad so I will go out on the limb 
to that effect but by the end of tns year I might look bad. 
Let's just hope that they do rather than myself 
because all of us are involved. 
QUESTIOtl: On the casualties, Mr. President, do you 
think that the figures of 12 per week in that category, are they 
an aberration or does your policy envision them to continue to 
decline during this year? 
THE PRESIDENT: No, they are not an aberration. T.hey 
are the result, frankly, of first an American withdrawal. 
American forces in Vietnam today, as you can tell from reading 
the reports, are in defensive positions. We are frankly just 
defending the area in which we have responsibility and there are 
less of them 0 
r·10RE 
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Consequently, our ,casualties go down for that 
reason. Secondly, they are down for another reason. The 
enemy doesn't have the punch it had because another point to 
look at is that South Vietnamese casualties are also sub-
', " . stantially down fr'8m what they were. What has happened is 
that the two operations, Cambodia and Laos, so very severely . 
disrupted the enemy's ability to wage offensive actions that 
for both Americans and South vietnamese the level of fighting 
is down. 
There again will be aberrations up and down, I 
would assume. Nobody can predict that. But the war is being 
wound down and as far as Americans are concerned, we trus·t it 
will continue to go down. 
THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. ~res.ident • 
END (AT 12:25 P.M. EDT) 
. . 
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